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Asian Equities: 
Not for the Fainthearted 
The short-term case for buying east Asian 
equities is strengthening. Selling pressure is 
approaching a climax, suggesting that 
currency stabilization and lower interest rates 
are not too far off. With the Asian asset 
class having lost over 50% in US$ terms 
since June 1997, the short-term upside for 
investors is significant. 
Beyond the three-month horizon, however, 
risks are large and unquantifiable. The first 
of these risks is external. Once China, Japan 
and Latin America begin to suffer from South 
East Asia's super competitive currencies, 
pressure for a new round of depreciation 
could mount. This pressure could be 
enhanced if a rising US trade deficit 
unleashes protectionism. 
The second risk is that the downtrend in 
corporate earnings will be much deeper and 
longer than currently expected. In that event, 
the Asian financial crisis could resemble that 
of the US in 1929-32 or Japan since 1990, 
rather than Mexico circa 1994. 
The third risk is that of policy mistakes and 
mounting social unrest. Having grown 
accustomed to super-charged growth and 
rising employment, Asian governments will 
find austerity and unemployment difficult to 
P deal with. I There is a real possibility that one or more of these scenarios will materialize as the 
economic crisis worsens. Investors should 
therefore continue to closely monitor 
devaluation pressures outside the region, 
and the course of credit, corporate earnings 
and politics inside it. 
Time for Bottom Fishing? 
Since June 1997, developing Asia equity markets 
have lost over 50% of their value in US$ terms. 
For some markets, such as Thailand and Korea, 
this comes at the tail end of a longer decline 
which began as early as 1994. Measured from 
their respective peaks, individual markets have 
shed anywhere between 38% and 95% in US$ @ terms, with Asia as a whole falling 60% (Table 1). 
In our Emerging Markets Strategists fax reports 
of the past few weeks, we wrote that thefinancial 
crisis in Asia may be reaching a temporary 
pause, and that this presented investors with a 
short-term buying opportunity. The recent 
bounceback in some of the region's currency and 
equity markets could mark the beginning of this 
process. 
The likely trigger for such upside is a reversal of 
investors' sentiment. Over the past few months, 
there has been an increasing effort on the part of 
western governments, international 
organizations, transnational banks and the 
governments of the region to restore confidence. 
The global risk of an Asian meltdown is now 
better appreciated, and there is growing sense 
that the industrial countries will act as a "lender 
of last resort" in order to prevent such a 
meltdown from happening. 
Once investors begin to believe that the worst of 
the financial crisis is over, the likely consequence 
will be a reversal of sentiment, with highly 
bullish implications for equity markets. 
As illustrated in Chart I, the growth of Asia's 
trade deficit over the past decade meant that its 
short term interest rates had to rise relative to 
the G7 so as to attract enough capital inflow. 
Table 1 
Asia's Market Declines (US$) 
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This positive relationship has now been broken. stock markets, the positive Uect on stock prices 
From the middle of 1997 onward, interest rate could be very large. 
spreads have widened dramatically against a 
sharp contraction in the trade deficit The bigger question, however, particularly for long-term investors, is what happens next? Even 
The principal question for investors is whether if equities stage a strong comebaik, does this 
and when this divergence will begin to close. mark the beginning of a sustained bull run? Or 
Over the next few months, the trade deficit is 
likely to turn into surplus, as Asia's slowdown 
dampens imports, while its competitive 
currencies fuel exports. In addition, debt 
rescheduling packages and international 
assistance should help stem the hemorrhage on 
the capital account - both directly, as well as 
indirectly by restoring some confidence. 
The combined effect of these two processes will 
be to ease much of the downward pressure on 
will markets revert back to a trading range? 
Worse still, could this be simply a false start, to be 
followed by further declines? 
The international nature of the crisis, both in and 
outside the region, makes its dynamics 
complicated, so the eventual outcome is highly 
uncertain. Investors could nevertheless benefit 
from focusing on three main risks: (1) currency 
contagion, (2) the profit downtrend, and (3) 
social instability and policy mistakes. 
the region's currencies. And once currencies The Currency Meltdown: Is It Over? 
begin to stabilize, interest rates spreads should 
start narrowing. The first risk is that currencies fail to stabilize. The main reason for this risk is that devaluation 
In that event, equity investors stand to benefit cannot be a solution for all countries: it solves the 
doubly - first from a large injection of liquidity problem in one country only by passing it to 
into financial markets, and secondly, from others. 
appreciating (or at least stabilizing) exchange 
rates. Given the depressed levels of the region's 
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Indeed, even in Asia itself the cycle of devaluation 
has affected some countries much more than 
others. As illustrated in Chart 2, the devaluation 
by the ASEAN countries has made other 
currencies in the region - primarily those of 
Korea, Taiwan and Japan - look more 
"expensive" (or less "cheap") than before. 
The impact on Latin America has been even 
greater. Relative to ASEAN, the Brazilian real 
effective exchange rate has appreciated by as  
much as 80% over the past ten years, followed by 
the Mexican peso (45% relative appreciation) and 
the Argentine peso (43% relative appreciation). 
Unless the ASEAN currencies appreciate 
signficantly - a rather remote possibility - the 
risk of currency contagion elsewhere in the 
developing world will remain significant for the 
foreseeable future.I 
Paradoxically, a recovery of Asian exports could 
create further devaluation pressures in the 
region. The Japanese economy is too weak to 
absorb Asia's export growth, so much of it will 
have to go to the western economies, particularly 
the US, with negative implications for their own 
external balances. Our sister publication, the 
International Bank Credit Analyst, estimates that 
the US could see its current account deficit rise to 
$200-250 bn, up from $160 bn currently.2 The 
result should be downward pressure on the 
$US/Yen, and possibly rising protectionism - 
both of which are bearish for the Asian currencies. 
Finally, the recent widening of interest rate 
spreads is at least partly justified by the region's 
reduced investment grade. Asia's risk premium is 
now much higher than before, and its invisible 
deficit - primarily the cost of servicing its foreign 
debt - has widened due to sharply depreciated 
currencies (South-East Asia's ratio of external 
debt to GDP has doubled to 90%, up from 45% in 
mid-1997). As long as this remains the case, 
interest rate spreads could stay high, even if the 
trade balance swings into surplus and the capital 
outflow stabilizes. 
For a fuller discussion of devaluation risks in Latin 
America, see "The Day AAer: What If Latin America 
Devalues?" The BCA Emerging Markets Strate@& 
December, 1997. For copies, please contact our 
circulation department pel: 514-499-9550; e-mail: 
circ@bcapub.com). 
See, Will the Asian Crisis Mean Mushrooming Trade 
Imbalances?", The International Bank Credit Analyst 
January, 1998. 
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I The Question of Earnings 
t The second major risk for investors is that the downturn in corporate earnings turns out to be deeper and longer than presently expected. 
Many observers, including some of our own 
publications, have on a number of occasions 
compared the current Asian situation with the 
Mexican crisis of 1994-5.3 Despite some 
similarities, the resolution of the two crises may 
prove different, and one key reason is profits. The 
recovery of the Mexican equity market since 1995 
proved sustainable largely because corporate 
earnings managed to stage a relatively quick 
comeback. This is unlikely to be the case in Asia. 
Before turning to the reasons for this bearish 
outlook, it is instructive to contemplate the 
possible consequences of an earnings meltdown. 
I Lessons for the U.S. and Japan 
In a regular business cycle, profits follow a rather 
predictable pattern, whose regularities are fairly 
well understood. For this reason, investors often 
"see through the cycle," focusing on the trend of 
earnings, rather than on their volatility. The 
situation is different during a period of sharp 
structural change, such as the Great Depression 
in the US of the 1930s, or the burst of the 
Japanese bubble in 1990. The reason is that 
unlike the typical downswing, a period of 
structural change is a "singular" event: neither its 
outcome nor its timing can be predicted with any 
certainty. Under such conditions, the trend itself 
becomes highly uncertain, which in turn forces 
investors to look not through the cycle, but very 
much at the cycle. 
This kind of behavior is evident from the 
experience of both the US and Japan. As 
illustrated in Chart 3 on page 14, during the 
1929-1932 bear phase, as well in the subsequent 
period of revival, US equities followed closely the 
underlying trends of production and corporate 
earnings (the latter correlation is somewhat 
weaker only because earnings data for the period 
are available on quarterly rather than monthly 
basis). 
1 A similarly tight link with earnings fundamentals 
is exhibited by the Japanese experience. As 
illustrated in Chart 4 on page 14, equity prices 
9 3 See 'Gauging the Impact of Asia's Turbulence: Lessons F'rom Mexico in 1995," Special Report No. 9, The BCA Global Investment Strategis& January 5,1998. 
failed to recover until profits finally turned up in 
1995. The market's recent downturn is again 
associated, at least partly, with growing 
apprehension about a pending collapse of growth 
and profit. 
Although the present Asian episode is still too 
young to draw definite parallels with the US and 
Japan, the significance of profits seems evident 
(Chart 5 on page 14). In fact, here the earnings 
down-cycle has been a leading indicator, 
precedingthe stock market crash by several 
months. 
The lesson from this comparison is twofold: 
First, in time of systemic distress, investors' 
eyes are fixed on the real economy; and 
Secondly, in the presence of great 
uncertainty, confidence is not fully restored 
until there is hard evidence that earnings are 
indeed finding a bottom 
Asia is presently going through a period of 
profound structural change, with clear symptoms 
of systemic distress. Within a single year, it has 
turned from a "miracle" to a pending disaster. 
This is a very a profound change which cannot 
fail to have a lasting impact on investors 
sentiment. And as the Japanese case painfully 
illustrates, the longer the economy lingers, the 
less forward-looking investors become. The 
implication is that unless the Asian economies 
stage a quick comeback - which now seems 
increasingly unlikely - investors will want to see 
hard evidence before putting their money back in. 
The risk that the Asian equity crisis turns out to 
be deeper and longer than Mexico's suggests the 
need for extreme caution. The magnitude of the 
potential downside is illustrated in Chart 6 on 
page 15, where we compare the Asian equity 
crisis with that of the US following the 1929 
market crash, and with Japan after its 1990 
market collapse (indices expressed in US$). 
Three observations are worth noting: 
First, a major bear market does not end 
quickly. The US bear phase lasted more than 
two years (September 1929 - June 1932), 
pushing prices down by 85%. In Japan, the 
downturn continued for more than five years 
(December 1989 - June 1995), erasing 76% of 
the market value in US$ terms - and even 
that may not be the end of the story. 
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Chart 6 
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Secondly, a premature entry into a major 
bear market can prove highly costly. A US 
investor buying the S&P400 index in 
December 1930, after it had already dropped 
51% from its peak, lost 69% in the following 
18 months; if he held onto his shares, his 
capital would have recovered only by 
November 1935, five years after he bought in. 
Similarly, a foreign investor buying the 
Japanese Topix index in July 1992, after the 
market had already given up 63% of its value 
in US$ terms, would have still ended up 
losing 35% by the time the market bottomed 
in 1995, four and a half years later. 
Thirdly, the decline in Asian equities, taken 
as an asset class, is still relatively moderate by 
the standards of "deflation-like" crises. Since 
The question, of course, is whether this risk will 
materialize, and the answer depends a lot on 
what happens to earnings. 
The Bad News: How Much More To Go? 
The medium-term outlook for Asian profits is 
negative. Based on our proprietary models, 
Chart 7 on page 16 provides earnings projections 
for developing Asia, as well as  for 
the world as a whole (data are expressed in 
inflation-adjusted According to these 
projections, Asian earnings per share could 
face declines of 20% or more over the course 
of 1998 (top panel). World earnings per share, 
on the other hand, are likely to move sideways 
June 1997, which we date as the beginning of The underlying models and approach are described 
the crisis, the average drop in equity prices in two Special Reports of The BCA Emerging Markets 
has been "only" 50% in US$ terms. Moreover, Strategist: 'Back to Basics: Earnings Growth and 
the crisis is merely a few months old - far the Relative Performance of Emerging Markets" 
shorter than the US and Japanese ones. The (June 26,1997), and "Emerging Markets Earnings: The 
potential downside in the region is therefore 'Good', the 'Bad' and the 'Ugly" (November 10,1997). 
still significant 
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Chart 7 
Real Earnings Per Share: Asia vs. the World 
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(second panel). Relative to the world benchmark, 
therefore, Asian earnings per share should fall 
another 20% from current levels, as illustrated in 
the bottom panel. (These projections assume 
exchange rates remain at current levels.) 
Unfortunately, 1998 is unlikely to be the end of the 
story. With reported profits lagging the economy, it 
is only in 1999 that Asia's present economic 
carnage, rising interest rates, and heavier foreign 
debt services will be fully reflected in corporate 
bottom lines. Thus, even in the best-case scenario, 
with the Asian economies troughing by the end of 
1998, corporate earnings are unlikely to recover 
before the end of 1999, at the earliest. Under a 
more realistic scenario, with the economic 
downturn lingering for two or more years, the 
earnings downturn will be even deeper. 
How Much is in the Price? 
Assuming exchange rates stabilize at current 
levels, Asian equity markets appear to have 
discounted much of the bad news for 1998, and 
possibly more. The rationale is illustrated in Chart 
8 on page 18, where we contrast Asia's IFC global 
index with Morgan Stanley's world index. 
The top panel of the chart expresses Asia's equity 
prices and earnings per share relative to the world 
average. In both cases, a rise indicates that Asia is 
outperforming, a decline that it is 
under-performing. The bottom panel depicts the 
Asia premium/discount This index is computed 
on the basis of the series in the top panel, and 
shows how much more or less investors are 
willing to pay for I US$ of Asian earnings relative 
to I US$ of world earnings5 
Based on these data, Asian earnings are currently 
trading at a 20% discount to world markets - close 
to their record depth in 1992. Does this mean that 
Asia has been oversold? The answer is yes, but 
only with respect to trailing earnings. If we instead 
look on projected earnings, the picture is rather 
different 
Note that Asia's current financial turmoil is only 
the boiling stage of a process which has been 
brewing for some time: 
5 For instance, in September 1994, the relative price 
index was 1.18, against a relative earnings index of 
0.91. The ratio of the two indices was 1.3, representing 
a 30% premium. This same result can be obtained by 
dividing Asia's P/E by the world P/E, subtracting one 
and multiplying by 100. 
First, the chart shows that investors have 
begun discounting the "Asian miracle" long 
before the current crisis. Sentiment toward 
these markets, as illustrated by the premium/ 
discount index in the bottom panel, has fallen 
gradually from a premium of 120% in 1989, 
to a discount of 20% presently. 
Secondly, the gradual deterioration of 
sentiment has been confumed by Asia's 
earnings under-performance. As illustrated 
in Chart 7, during the early 1990s this 
under-performance came because Asian 
earnings per share rose more slowlythan 
world earnings. But since 1996, Asian 
earnings per share were actually falling 
against a rising world trend. 
Equities therefore face strong headwinds from 
both falling earnings and collapsing sentiment. 
Although it is impossible to tell at what point 
these trends begin to reverse, given the depth of 
the Asian crisis, it is hard to see a surrtained 
recovery of sentiment without a clear reversal of 
the earnings trend. According to our models, 
Asian earnings are likely to continue 
underpefroming for the rest of the year (as 
indicated by dotted line in the top panel of 
Chart 8 on page 18). And if the region's 
economies weaken further, the process has even 
more room to run. 
Based on these earnings predictions, Asian 
equities face an uphill battle. The thick dotted 
line at the bottom of Chart 8 on page 18 projects 
what will happen to the Asian premium/discount 
if relative earnings move down according to our 
models while relative equity prices remain 
unchanged. It suggests that under these 
conditions, Asian equities will be able to 
outperform only if their discount narrows to less 
than 5943, down from 20% currently. 
In other words, in order to outperform, Asia 
needs to see a very large improvement in 
investors' sentiment - this at a time when 
earnings are heading down, both absolutely as 
well as relatively. 
The probability of such a scenario actually 
happening seems low. Of course, events such as 
announcements of a debt rescheduling package 
or a major policy shift could boost sentiment 
quite sharply, but the question is for how long. As 
the Asian earnings grind continues, deteriorating 
valuations are likely to put continuous 
downward pressure on sentiment 
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I Policy Mistakes and Social Unrest 
The third risk is that despite all good intentions, 8 policy mistakes end up undermining rather 
boosting confidence, and that this could be 
further aggravated by bursts of social unrest. 
I 
Things could be complicated further by the 
eruption of social unrest. Many of the region's 
economies have experienced close to two decades 
of rising employment and wages. This pattern 
has now been broken by a combination of mass 
layoffs, wage reductions and rising prices of basic 
necessities. The result could be an explosive f-1 social cocktail, with highly uncertain 
consequences. 
I At a general level, there is still wide disagreement ! on the proper remedy for the Asian crisis. The 
IMF is imposing austerity requirements which 
A related risk comes from the structural aspect of 
the IMF programs - namely the requirement that 
countries implement deep market reforms. This 
is particularly problematic in places such as 
Korea, where the entire matrix of relationships 
between the chaebol (conglomerates) and 
government is coming under assault. A different 
but equally destabilizing situation exists in 
Indonesia, where structural reforms challenge 
president Suharto's massive control over the 
country's corporate sector. 
. - 
The big issue here is not that there are intimate 
I ties between politics and business, for such ties 
I are common in many other regions. It is rather i that these ties will hove to changc mdicolly and rapidly, and that there is no external authority to 
impose such changes. 
have been traditionally aimed at stabilizing 
over-heated economies, with bloated government 
deficits. The root of Asia's crisis, however, is 
largely the consequence of excess investment. 
Much of Asia's capacity has been built to service 
export markets, and this capacity has now grown 
i Finally, although the global risks of an Asian meltdown are now better appreciated, the bailout could still be botched. The main problem is that 
the world lacks a clear "hegemon," such as 
Britain in the nineteenth century, or the US until 
0) the 1970s. This means that there is no evident 
"lender of last resort," and that any assistance 
I far beyond what can be absorbed by foreign demand. Asia needs more, not less demand, which means that the IMF medicine of fiscal and 
monetary tightening may end up making a bad 
situation worse. 
package to Asia needs to be coordinated among 
numerous and often reluctant players. Given the 
magnitude of the problem in Asia, particularly if 
trouble spreads to Japan, China, or Taiwan, there 
is a real risk that even with the best intentions 
rescue packages may end up being too little, too 
late. (Clinton's deepening legal problems could 
create a power vacuum, thus strengthening the 
"isolationist" Congress, and undermine the US 
ability to act) 
Investment Conclusions 
Afler dropping by over 50% in US$ terms, Asian 
equities offer a short-term buying opportunity for 
investors who can stomach the risk. The main 
upside comes from the external accounts. As the 
trade deficit turns into surplus, and provided that 
Asia's debt problems are being effectively 
addressed through debt rescheduling and aid 
packages, confidence could be restored, leading 
to sharply falling interest rates, some currency 
appreciation, and a reversal of investors' 
sentiment. 
However, for long-term investors risks remain 
uncomfortably high and unquantifiable. The first 
danger is that the currency will fail to stabilize, 
either because of contagion in China, Japan, 
Taiwan, Latin America or elsewhere in the 
developing world, or due to growing 
protectionism in the western economies. 
The second risk is that the earnings downtrend 
proves to be much steeper and longer than 
anticipated. Our own view is that profits should 
not begin to recover before 1999 at the earliest. If 
that turns out to be the case, investors' sentiment 
could take a serious blow, failing to recover until 
Merprofits have marked a clear bottom. 
The third risk is that policy makers in and 
outside the region will err in their remedies, or 
drag their feet in implementing them, and that 
rising social tensions will increase political 
uncertainty. 
These risks suggest that long-term investors 
should not raise their exposure to Asia for the 
time being. Only as some of these concerns begin 
to dissipate, will a broader entry into the market 
become warranted. 
Jonathan Nitzan 
Senior Editor 
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